| 文献信息 |
| Do Stock Prices Influence Corporate Decisions? Evidence from the Technology Bubble | | 文献摘要：
Do firms issue stock when prices seem irrationally high? Do they invest or save the proceeds from
the sale of overvalued stocks? Is value created or destroyed in the process? This paper uses a novel
identification strategy to tackle these questions. We examine the capital investment, stock issuance,
and cash savings behavior of financially constrained and unconstrained non-tech manufacturers ("old
economy firms") around the 1990''s technology bubble. Our results suggest that, because they relax
financing constraints, high stock prices affect corporate policies. In particular, during the bubble, constrained
non-tech firms issued equity in response to mispricing and used the proceeds to invest. They also saved
part of those funds in their cash accounts. We do not find similar patterns for unconstrained non-tech
firms, neither for tech firms. Our findings do not support the notion that managers systematically issue
overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders, destroying
economic value. Rather, our evidence implies that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of
the economy may have welfare-increasing effects across other sectors. |
|
|
| 详细介绍 |
Do firms issue stock when prices seem irrationally high? Do they invest or save the proceeds from
the sale of overvalued stocks? Is value created or destroyed in the process? This paper uses a novel
identification strategy to tackle these questions. We examine the capital investment, stock issuance,
and cash savings behavior of financially constrained and unconstrained non-tech manufacturers ("old
economy firms") around the 1990''s technology bubble. Our results suggest that, because they relax
financing constraints, high stock prices affect corporate policies. In particular, during the bubble, constrained
non-tech firms issued equity in response to mispricing and used the proceeds to invest. They also saved
part of those funds in their cash accounts. We do not find similar patterns for unconstrained non-tech
firms, neither for tech firms. Our findings do not support the notion that managers systematically issue
overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders, destroying
economic value. Rather, our evidence implies that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of
the economy may have welfare-increasing effects across other sectors. |
|
|
管理学 
风险投资